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Investing with Fast Thinking 
 
 
Abstract 
Using data from a major online peer-to-peer lending market, we document that investors follow a 
simple rule of thumb under time pressure: they rush to invest in loans with high interest rates 
without sufficiently examining credit ratings, which are freely available on the trading interface. 
Our experiments show that making credit rating information more salient “nudges” investors into 
better decisions. Firsthand experience matters for learning for non-informational reasons: An 
investor responds differently when observing a default of her own loan, relative to observing a 
default of another investor’s loan.  
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I. Introduction 
The last four decades have witnessed significant progress in theories of judgment and decision-
making. One prominent insight in this literature is the so-called two-system approach. As 
recently summarized by Daniel Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and Slow, System 1 operates 
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort, while System 2 is slow and deliberate, 
allocating attention to effortful mental activities. While both systems are thought to be active in 
decision-making, System 1 typically dominates. System 2, usually in inactive mode, only 
contributes to the decision process when System 1 runs into difficulty. For convenience, we use 
“fast thinking” to refer to decision-making with System 1, and “slow thinking” to refer to 
decision-making with System 2. 
While the two-system theory suggests that fast thinking influences most of our everyday 
decision-making, existing studies have been primarily conducted in experimental settings. The 
extent to which fast thinking affects decisions in real financial markets is an open question. How 
do investors make financial decisions using fast thinking? How do they learn from these 
decisions? Can we modify the environment to influence investors’ decision-making at a 
subconscious level? The greatest challenge in answering these questions is identifying a financial 
market in which investors must make quick decisions and we can reliably measure the decision 
time as well as the outcomes of those decisions.  
We examine these questions in an online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market, in which 
individual investors bid on unsecured microloans listed by individual borrowers. We obtain 
transaction data from Renrendai, one of the leading P2P lending platforms in China. Three 
features make this platform ideal for analyzing investments made using fast thinking. First, 
investors in this market have to make quick decisions. Due to the market environment, which 
will be explained in detail in Section II, loans on this platform are generally highly appealing and 
quickly get fully funded. For example, 25% of the loans listed on Renrendai are fulfilled within 
42 seconds and 90% are fulfilled in under eight minutes. Second, Renrendai records time stamps 
for all transactions, allowing us to measure investors’ decision time. Third, Renrendai is a 
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sizeable market with several years of detailed investing data. Our main sample contains 10,385 loans 
and 205,724 transactions. The cumulative principal of the loans during our sample period is over 
$100 million. Our sample spans two years and four months, which not only allows us to track the 
performance of the loans, but also enables us to analyze investors’ learning in this fast-thinking 
context.  
Our findings are the following. Under pressure to make quick decisions, investors rush to 
invest in loans with high interest rates, disregarding borrowers’ credit ratings, even when the 
latter are listed on the online trading interface. Specifically, we find that, all else equal, loans 
with higher interest rates are funded more quickly. Our regression shows that a one-standard-
deviation increase in interest rate reduces the fulfillment time (i.e., the time from the moment a 
loan is listed to the moment it is fully funded) by 36%. In contrast, there is no significant relation 
between the fulfillment time and credit ratings. 
We further show empirically and experimentally that when time pressure is stronger, 
investors rely more heavily on interest rates. Empirically, our quantile regressions show that 
fulfillment time for “faster” loans is even more sensitive to interest rate. To examine whether fast 
thinking causes investors’ reliance on interest rates, we conduct a controlled experiment. 
Subjects in the treatment group face time pressure when making investment decisions, while 
those in the control group do not. We find that, under time pressure, subjects are more likely to 
choose loans with higher interest rates, and are consequently more exposed to riskier loans and 
eventual defaults.  
Focusing on interest rate is a sensible strategy for this market, because returns are highly 
correlated with offered interest rates. Renrendai guarantees to repay investors the outstanding 
principal of a loan if the borrower fails to make a monthly payment. This principal guarantee 
mechanism, which was credible at the time, significantly limits investors’ exposure to borrowers’ 
credit risk. However, investors still forgo interest payments for roughly two months before 
receiving the remaining principal from Renrendai. Incorporating credit rating information can 
thus improve investment returns substantially.  We show that by avoiding loans with “High Risk” 
(HR) ratings, an investor can improve her returns by over 1% per year on average. 
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Our empirical findings suggest that one might be able to “nudge” investors into making 
better decisions by making credit rating information more salient. We conduct a controlled 
experiment. Specifically, we modify the original Renrendai interface by enlarging the font size 
of the credit rating information, changing its font color, and moving it to a prominent spot for the 
treatment group, while keeping the original interface for the control group. Our experiments 
show that, relative to subjects in the control group, those in the treatment group pay more 
attention to credit ratings, are less likely to choose loans with HR ratings, experience fewer 
defaults, and have better performance.  
Do investors learn from experience to overcome biases in making investment decisions? 
We show that firsthand experience matters for learning. Specifically, after personally 
experiencing a loan default, an investor tends to increase her decision time, avoids loans with 
“High Risk” ratings, and consequently obtains higher returns. In contrast, observing others 
experiencing a default has negligible effects on an investor’s behavior. That is, investors who 
experience loan defaults as “participants” appear to learn more from these defaults than do 
investors who simply witness defaults as “observers.” 
One potential explanation for the difference in investors’ learning is inattention. Investors 
may pay more attention to defaults on their own loans than defaults on other investors’ loans, 
which they may not even notice. That is, participants may have an informational advantage over 
observers. However, inattention cannot explain the entire firsthand experience effect because 
similar results arise in our controlled experiment, where all subjects, regardless of whether their 
selected loan defaults, are informed about the default event.1 We conjecture that participants and 
observers process the same default information differently. Experiencing a default personally 
and suffering losses, participants are compelled to reexamine their decision processes and, 
consequently, improve future decisions. In contrast, investors do not respond to the default on 
                                                          
1 Other potential explanations include the wealth effect (i.e., participants experience a negative wealth shock from 
the default, while observers do not) and selection effect (i.e., individuals with low ability might stop investing after 
experiencing a default). However, these two effects are absent or negligible in our experiments, 
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fellow investors’ loans strongly, perhaps because they do not believe they are subject to the same 
mistakes in decision making.  
Our research contributes to the psychology and economics literature on cognitive biases. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) established the foundation for studies of heuristics and biases. 
However, studies of decision biases related to fast thinking in a real-world setting have been rare 
due to the inherent challenges of measuring decision time.2 To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to investigate the effect of fast thinking on investment decisions. Our study shows that 
relying on fast thinking leads individual investors to pay excessive attention to salient interest 
rates and gravitate to loans with higher rates, ignoring their higher default risk. Our paper relates 
broadly to research on the role of limited attention in financial markets. Given the wealth of 
available financial information and the scarcity of attention, investors tend to focus on the most 
salient features (Benartzi and Lehrer, 2015).3 
Our paper is also related to the literature on nudging (Thaler and Benartzi, 
2004). Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, and Rangel (2011) show that individuals tend to pay attention 
to snacks located in a focal region. Milosavljevic, Navalpakkam, Koch, and Rangel (2012) show 
that a subtle change in visual prominence influences real food choices. In our experiment, by 
increasing the salience of credit ratings, we can nudge investors to pay more attention to credit 
risk and improve their investment decisions.  
Our paper adds to the literature on learning from experience. One intriguing recent 
finding is that, rather than forming expectations (e.g., on inflation) based on all historical data, 
people seem to rely more on personal experiences (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016). A 
                                                          
2 It has been demonstrated that, in experimental settings, faster thinking is associated with greater risk-taking (Cella, 
Dymond, Cooper, and Turnbull, 2007; DeDonno and Demaree, 2008; Candler and Pronin, 2012). We examine fast 
thinking in a real-world context, using transaction data from the online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market. In a 
recent study, Heller, Shah, Guryan, Ludwig, Mullainathan, and Pollack (2017) carry out large-scale randomized 
controlled trials and find that behavioral intervention and education programs can help young people slow down and 
reflect on their automatic thoughts and behaviors. Such interventions reduced the rates of arrests and readmission to 
jail, and improved school engagement and graduation rates. 
3 Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks. Da, Engelberg, 
and Gao (2011) document that Google search frequency is associated with investor attention and negatively predicts 
future stock returns. Investors underreact more to earnings surprises when they are distracted, e.g., when earnings 
announcements are on Fridays (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009) or when there are multiple announcements on the same 
day (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009). Our paper shows that time pressure leads investors to fixate on interest rates 
and ignore valuable information that is freely available on the trading interface.  
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growing number of studies have analyzed the effect of experiences on expectation formation and 
investments in the stock market (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003; Greenwood and Nagel, 2009; 
Knupfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimaki, 2017; Andersen, Hanspal, and Nielsen, 2018) and credit 
markets (Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam, 2016), CEO decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Dittmar and Duchin, 2016; Schoar and Zuo, 2017), leverage 
choice (Koudijs and Voth, 2016), IPO investments (Kaustia and Knupfer, 2008; Chiang, 
Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman, 2011), retirement savings (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 
2009) and policy-making (Malmendier, Nagel, and Yan, 2017). The experience effect has been 
analyzed theoretically in Ehling, Graniero, and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2018), Malmendier, Pouzo, 
and Vanasco (2018), and Nagel and Xu (2018). Our results on firsthand experience are closely 
related to those in Andersen, Hanspal, and Nielsen (2018), which show that investors who lose 
money on investments in bank stocks during the recent global financial crisis subsequently shy 
away from risk in their investment portfolios. One key difference is the nature of the experienced 
loss: we consider smaller, more frequent shocks, while the shocks in Andersen, Hanspal, and 
Nielsen (2018) are rare and more substantial. More importantly, our paper adds to this 
experience literature by showing in a controlled experiment that participants and observers 
respond differently even if they are provided with the same information. Thus, we can conclude 
that firsthand experience effect cannot be fully attributed to inattention. 
Our findings also complement the literature, whereby investors form different beliefs 
based on differential interpretations of the same information (Hong and Stein, 2007). For 
instance, investors’ beliefs are shown to be strongly influenced by their prior portfolio choices 
(Kuhnen, Rudorf, and Weber, 2017) and political leanings (Meeuwis, Parker, and Vanasco, 
2018). Our evidence suggests that first-hand experience can also contribute to differential 
interpretations of the same information in forming beliefs. 
Finally, our paper is part of the growing literature on P2P lending. Since 2006, P2P 
lending has become an increasingly important method of providing small loans to individual 
borrowers. Most existing studies focus on Prosper.com. Investigating investor behavior, Zhang 
and Liu (2012) find evidence of rational herding among investors. Lin and Viswanathan (2015), 
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Pope and Sydnor (2011), Ravina (2018), and Duarte, Siegel, and Young (2012) show the roles of 
home bias, racial bias, the beauty premium, and trust, respectively, in P2P lending decisions.4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the institutional 
background and develops our main hypotheses. Section III analyzes investment decisions made 
using fast thinking. Sections IV and V examine the roles of time pressure and salience, 
respectively. Section VI analyzes learning and Section VII concludes.  
 
II. Institutional Background and Hypotheses 
A. Institutional background 
Our data are collected from Renrendai, a major P2P lending platform in China. Online P2P 
lending was first introduced in China in 2007 and grew rapidly from 2011 to 2015. Renrendai 
was founded in 2010 and has an AAA rating, the highest rating for P2P lending platforms, from 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. We focus on credit loans, which have no collateral and 
comprise 76% of all loans made on Renrendai during our sample period.  
To receive a credit loan, a borrower is required to provide identification information, as 
well as to submit information on income, employment, and creditworthiness. To provide 
guidance for investors, Renrendai issues its own credit ratings, ranging from excellent to poor as 
follows: AA, A, B, C, D, E, and HR (i.e., High Risk). Each rating corresponds to a range of 
credit scores,5 and ratings increase with the number of optional documents submitted, including 
home deed, car title, marriage certificate, diploma, cell phone number, Weibo account (the 
                                                          
4 Regarding borrowers, Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, and Shue (2009) show that lenders effectively use soft and non-
standard information to evaluate borrowers’ creditworthiness. Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2013) and Michels 
(2012) document that friendship networks and voluntary disclosure help reduce information asymmetry in the P2P 
lending markets. 
5 AA rating: credit score above 210; A rating: credit score in the range [180, 209]; B rating: credit score in the range 
[150, 179]; C rating: credit score in the range [130, 149]; D rating: credit score in the range [110, 129]; E rating: 
credit score in the range [100, 109]; and HR rating: credit score below 100. 
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Chinese version of Twitter), home address, and video interview. Renrendai updates each 
borrower’s credit rating monthly based on the repayment status of her outstanding loans.6 
Potential borrowers on Renrendai submit loan applications, specifying the requested 
amount, term, and interest rate. The maximum amount for each loan varies with the borrower’s 
credit quality, ranging from ¥3,000 to ¥500,000 ($1 = ¥6.91 as of March 15, 2017). A borrower 
is allowed to have multiple loans outstanding as long as the total amount does not exceed a given 
credit line, determined by her credit rating. There are eight maturities for credit loans available at 
Renrendai: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 24, and 36 months. Borrowers specify the interest rates of their 
loans, subject to the minimum interest rate requirement determined by Renrendai for each credit 
rating. In our sample, the minimum interest rate is 10% and the maximum is 24%. 
Renrendai denies approximately 95% of loan applications due to poor credit ratings or 
insufficient verifications. Approved applications are listed on the platform and can be viewed by 
all potential investors. Each listing includes loan characteristics as well as borrower information 
such as credit rating, age, education, marital status, monthly income reported as a range, 
possession of a house (apartment) and/or a car, and the presence of a mortgage or car loan. There 
are additional verifications that a borrower can provide voluntarily (e.g., credit report, 
employment record, and home address). Figure 1 depicts a sample loan on the Renrendai website 
(translated by the authors from Chinese to English).  
Renrendai does not charge investors any fees. Investors can choose to lend multiples of 
¥50 at a loan’s pre-specified interest rate. Once the requested amount is fully funded, or if a loan 
cannot be fully funded in seven days, the funding process stops. As a result, the borrower 
receives either 100% funding or no funding.  Prepayment is allowed with a penalty of 1% of the 
outstanding balance.  
During the funding process, each investor’s commitment is posted online with a time 
stamp; this information is visible to all investors in real time. This feature enables us to calculate 
                                                          
6 A borrower’s credit rating is updated monthly. The credit score increases by 1 point each month if payments 
remain current. The credit score is reduced by 3 points if a payment is overdue by 1–30 days, and is set to zero if a 
payment is overdue by more than 30 days. 
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the timing of each loan’s funding process to the seconds, which is not feasible on other P2P 
lending platforms, such as Prosper.com.  
B. Hypotheses 
Renrendai is an ideal context for studying financial decision-making using fast thinking. First, 
investors are under pressure to make quick decisions. Bank deposit rates in China are highly 
regulated and kept artificially low (see, for example, Lardy (2008)). Hence, the P2P lending 
market, if organized properly to limit borrowers’ credit risk, is appealing to many households. 
Indeed, in our sample, more than 90% of loans are fully funded within eight minutes after they 
are listed on Renrendai. Because loan details are not observable until loans are publicly listed, 
investors have a short time frame for making decisions.7 
  Second, Renrendai guarantees that it will repay investors the outstanding principal of a 
loan within 31 days if a borrower fails to make a monthly payment. Hence, investors only forgo 
roughly two months of interest payments when a default occurs. This guarantee is considered 
credible because Renrendai not only has an excellent credit rating but also levies an upfront 
service charge and a monthly management fee for each funded loan. The upfront service charge 
depends on the borrower’s credit rating, and can be as high as 5% of the principal. The monthly 
management fee is about 0.1–0.35% of the outstanding balance. Principal guarantee significantly 
limits lenders’ exposure to borrowers’ credit risk,8 further modulating the necessity of analyzing 
                                                          
7 As a comparison, loans listed on Prosper.com, one of the two leading online P2P platforms in the U.S., often take 
several days to get funded. Moreover, Renrendai differs from Prosper.com on many dimensions. For example, (1) 
On Renrendai, potential investors observe the bid/investment of each lender in real time, while on Prosper, they only 
see the fraction of the requested amount that is fulfilled—not the number of lenders or the size of each lender’s 
investment; (2) Renrendai provides the funding start and end time for each completed loan, while Prosper records 
only the start time of the funding process; (3) On Renrendai, a loan is made only if 100% of its listed amount is 
raised, while Prosper permits a listed loan to move forward if at least 70% of the listed amount is fulfilled; (4) 
Renrendai suggests the minimum interest rate based on a borrower’s credit rating and the borrower determines the 
interest rate, while Prosper determines a uniform interest rate for loans made to all borrowers with the same credit 
rating (as of December 2010); (5) Credit loans listed on Renrendai are much smaller than those listed on Prosper; (6) 
Renrendai promises to repay the principal if the borrower defaults on the loan, while Prosper does not provide such 
a guarantee. 
8 Hence, investment returns and interest rates are highly correlated. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between a 
loan’s interest rate and its ex post internal rate of return (IRR) is 0.54 in our sample. 
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credit risk. Based on the insights in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), principal guarantee is 
especially appealing to investors with loss aversion.  
Third, as shown in Figure 1, the interest rate is prominently displayed on the trading 
interface: it is presented in a large font at the top of the screen, attracting investors’ attention. In 
contrast, credit ratings are displayed in a small font and at a much less prominent location. Hence, 
we hypothesize that investors’ attention gravitates towards interest rates and that they may 
disregard other information, such as borrowers’ credit ratings. 
We also examine how investors learn when they make decisions using System 1. One 
important insight on learning in the recent literature is the so-called experience effect. For 
example, Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016) find that rather than forming expectations based 
on all historical data, people tend to rely more on their experiences. We attempt to shed light on 
this insight by distinguishing the effect of experiencing an event as a participant from that of 
experiencing it as an observer. Specifically, when a borrower defaults on a loan, investors may 
experience the event in two different ways. If an investor has exposure to the loan, she suffers a 
loss and feels the pain. We refer to this as “experience as a participant.” Alternatively, an 
investor may observe the default of a loan she has no position in, which we refer to as 
“experience as an observer.” How do these two types of experiences affect investors’ behavior? 
Our dataset allows us to track each investor’s experience and subsequent investments to address 
this question. We also examine the reasons behind the different reactions to default events 
among observers and participants.  
 
III. Investing with Fast Thinking 
A. Data 
We extract data from Renrendai on March 10, 2016. Our main sample spans the period from 
September 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014. We exclude loans originated before September 1, 
2012 because Renrendai did not record the start time of the funding process before this date. We 
exclude loans originated after December 31, 2014 because the repayment status of most of these 
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loans is not yet available at the end of our sample. Our main sample contains 10,385 loans 
funded by 205,724 investments, corresponding to 25,314 unique investors. 
Loan and borrower characteristics are reported in Panel B of Table 1. The mean and 
median values of the interest rate are 12.70% and 12.00%, respectively. The mean and median 
loan amounts are ¥25,372 and ¥14,000, respectively. The loan term ranges from 3 to 36 months, 
with an average of 10.3 months and a median of 9 months. 
We find that 71.2% of Renrendai loans are categorized as having a high risk of default 
(HR), and 87.3% of the loans have male borrowers. The mean and median ages of the borrowers 
are 32.9 and 32 years, respectively. About one third of borrowers hold a bachelor’s degree or 
higher, and 56.7% have work experience of three or more years. Financially, 41.3% of the 
borrowers have a monthly income exceeding ¥10,000. While 55.5% of borrowers are 
homeowners and 40.8% own a car, only 21.7% of borrowers have a current mortgage and 8% 
have an outstanding car loan.  
B. Thinking fast 
Due to low bank deposit rates, investors find Renrendai loans appealing and quickly snatch them 
up once they are listed. Indeed, 25% of loans get fully funded in 42 seconds, 75% of loans get 
funded in less than three minutes, and 90% in less than eight minutes. For convenience, we refer 
to the period from the time when a loan is listed to the time when the loan is fully funded as 
“FulfillmentTime.” A loan is labeled a “fast loan” if its FulfillmentTime is less than 42 seconds, 
the 25th percentile of FulfillmentTime in our sample.  
The funding process has accelerated during our sample period; that is, the distribution of 
FulfillmentTime shifts to the left over time. Given how rapidly loan listings disappear from the 
screen, investors have to make quick decisions. We contrast loan and borrower characteristics for 
fast loans with those for all other loans and report the results in Panel C of Table 1.  
On average, fast loans are smaller (¥13,873 vs. ¥29,299) than other loans and offer higher 
interest rates (13.71% vs. 12.36%), though they have similar terms (10.57 vs. 10.21 months). 
Interestingly, although fast loans have higher default rates (19.8% vs. 16.7%), they also have 
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higher IRRs (11.67% vs. 10.53%). Borrowers of fast loans are more likely to be HR-rated (78.7% 
vs. 68.6%), male (88.2% vs. 86.9%), and younger (average age of 31.31 vs. 33.43 years). Fast-
loan borrowers are less likely to be employed for over three years, tend to have lower monthly 
incomes, and are less likely to own a house or a car. Overall, fast loans appear riskier than other 
loans.  
C. Primacy of interest rate 
We posit that investors primarily focus on the interest rates offered and rush to high-interest-rate 
loans without sufficiently examining other information in loan contracts, such as the borrower’s 
credit risk. As a first step in examining this conjecture, we test whether investors’ decision speed 
depends on interest rate, i.e., whether loans with higher interest rates are funded more quickly. 
Specifically, we run an OLS regression of Ln(FulfillmentTime) on Interest Rate and HR, where 
FulfillmentTime is the number of seconds it takes for the loan to be fully funded, Interest Rate is 
the interest rate offered in the loan contract, and HR is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the 
loan is rated “high risk” and 0 otherwise. We cluster standard errors by week, and include 12 
verification fixed effects, week fixed effects, day-of-the-week fixed effects, and hour-of-the-day 
fixed effects to control for time variation in investors’ bidding speed. Results are presented in the 
first column of Table 2. 
The coefficient estimate for Interest Rate is -0.206, with a t-statistic of over 19. Hence, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the interest rate (2.20%) reduces FulfillmentTime by 36% (=1-
exp(-0.206*2.20)). For example, for a loan with the median FulfillmentTime (80 seconds), a one-
standard-deviation increase in interest rate reduces the FulfillmentTime to 51(=80*(1-36%)) 
seconds. In contrast, the coefficient estimate for HR is -0.036 (t=1.28). If investors avoided loans 
with HR ratings, this coefficient would be positive rather than negative.  
Some of the control variables are worth mentioning. Naturally, larger loans take longer to 
fund. To control for potential non-linear effects, we include both Ln(amount) and the square of 
Ln(amount) as control variables. The coefficient of Term is 0.026 (t=3.57), suggesting that loans 
with longer maturities take longer to fund. Interestingly, it appears that investors also respond to 
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some borrower characteristics. For example, the coefficient of MasterOrHigher is -0.13 (t=3.10), 
suggesting that if a borrower has a graduate degree, her loans are funded more quickly. Similarly, 
loans to borrowers who have monthly income between ¥5,000 and 10,000 or own a house are 
funded more quickly.  
D. Loan performance 
D.1 Loan return and interest rate 
Given the principal guarantee, the performance of a loan should have a strong positive 
association with its interest rate. Hence, it is sensible for investors to focus on interest rates. To 
examine this, we measure the performance of a loan using IRR – CD Rate, where IRR is the 
realized internal rate of return of the loan and CD Rate is the rate of return for a bank deposit 
with a similar term. IRR can be computed as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =�𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑡(1 + 𝐼𝑅𝑅)𝑡 ,𝑇
𝑡=1
 
where Principal is the loan amount, T is the term, and 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑡 is the realized cash flow at 
time t, which may be a scheduled payment, a prepayment from the borrower, or the payment 
from Renrendai when the borrower defaults.   
To test these hypotheses, we regress IRR – CD Rate on Interest Rate, HR, and other loan 
and borrower characteristics. The results are reported in Table 3. In both specifications, we 
include week fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, and hour-of-day fixed effects to account 
for potential time trends in loan performance, market conditions, or investor preferences. As 
shown in column (1), the coefficient of Interest Rate is 0.804 (t=31.78). That is, a 1% increase in 
the interest rate leads to an 80-basis-point increase in IRR – CD Rate.  
This evidence confirms our hypothesis: Renrendai investors’ reliance on interest rates is a 
sensible response to the pressure to make quick decisions. However, do investors miss other 
information that is relevant for loan performance? We analyze this question next. 
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D.2 Loan returns, credit ratings, and other characteristics 
Consistent with the hypothesis that investors pay insufficient attention to credit ratings, we find 
that after controlling for interest rate, HR is negatively related to performance. In column (1) of 
Table 3, for example, the coefficient of HR is -1.109 (t=19.34). That is, all else equal, the 
average return is 1.109% lower for loans with HR ratings than for other loans, on average. This is 
somewhat surprising – one might have expected that HR loans would offer higher average 
returns since they are riskier. However, it appears that investors do not realize that these high-
interest-rate HR loans are more likely to default. With two months of interest forgone upon 
default (and remaining principal paid off by Renrendai), the average returns of HR loans are 
lower ex post.     
Loan performance appears correlated with other variables that are easily observable. For 
example, IRR – CD Rate is strongly negatively correlated with the loan term. As shown in 
column (1), the coefficient of Term is -0.106 (t=21.05). Since there is no secondary market for 
investors to resell their loans, one might assume that loans with longer maturities are less liquid 
investments and should command higher average returns. In our sample, however, loans with 
longer maturities have lower average returns. IRR – CD Rate is also strongly negatively 
correlated with the loan amount. For example, in column (4), the coefficient of Ln(Amount) is -
0.297 (t=8.08) after controlling for the interest rate, loan characteristics, the borrower’s credit 
rating, and other borrower characteristics. IRR – CD Rate is also strongly correlated with 
borrower characteristics, even after controlling for the interest rate and the borrower’s credit 
rating. We find that loans to female borrowers, younger borrowers, and borrowers with college 
degrees perform better. We add verification fixed effects in column (2) and obtain results very 
similar to those in column (1). 
D.3 Loan default 
We now examine whether a borrower’s credit rating predicts loan default after controlling for 
interest rate. Specifically, we create a dummy variable Defaultit, which equals 1 if a loan i 
defaults on day t, and run a Cox proportional hazards model with the same independent variables 
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as those in Table 3. As shown in column (1) of Table 4, the coefficient of interest rate is 0.109 
(t=6.71). That is, loans with higher interest rates are more likely to default. However, even after 
controlling for interest rate, an HR rating still predicts a higher likelihood of default. As shown in 
row 2, the coefficient of HR is 2.011 (t=8.26). This implies that, for loans with a given interest 
rate, investors can reduce their exposure to default by avoiding HR loans.  
Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, we find that larger loans and loans with 
longer maturities are more likely to default. In addition, loans to male borrowers, older 
borrowers, and borrowers without college degrees are more likely to default. Adding verification 
fixed effects yields similar results; see column (2).   
These results are consistent with the interpretation that investors fail to fully appreciate 
the information provided by borrower characteristics. Interestingly, it appears that Renrendai 
also fails to fully incorporate the information in borrower characteristics into their credit ratings. 
That is, these borrower characteristics predict the likelihood of default even after controlling for 
credit rating.  
D.4 Portfolio-based evidence  
The above evidence suggests that many observables, such as credit ratings and other loan and 
borrower characteristics, are not incorporated into loan prices (i.e., interest rates). To further 
examine this idea, we estimate the gains an investor can achieve by paying more attention to 
these characteristics. Our analysis below focuses on credit rating.  
For each week, we calculate the principal-amount-weighted averages of IRR – CD Rate 
for HR loans and non-HR loans. We then calculate the time series averages of IRR – CD Rate for 
HR and non-HR loans, and the difference in these averages. The results are reported in Table 5. 
As shown in the first row, HR loans underperform non-HR loans by 1.121% (t=5.26). The 
magnitude is comparable to the HR coefficient estimate in Table 3. Our interpretation is that 
investors pay insufficient attention to credit rating and the corresponding default risk, because 
they only lose two months of interest payments when default occurs due to the principal 
guarantee.  
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For HR loans, the higher probability of default and greater loss in interest payments upon 
default dominate the effect of higher interest payments when default does not occur. The higher 
the interest rate, the bigger the consequences from neglecting the information in credit ratings. 
Thus, the potential performance improvement from paying attention to credit ratings should 
increase with interest rates. To test this prediction, for each week, we sort loans into quintiles by 
interest rate. Then, for each quintile, we calculate the value-weighted averages of (IRR – CD 
Rate) for HR loans and non-HR loans. Finally, we calculate, for each quintile, the time series 
averages of IRR – CD Rate for HR and non-HR loans, and their differences. The results are 
reported in rows 2 through 6 in Table 5. The underperformance of HR loans is highly significant 
for all quintiles, and, consistent with our prediction, the magnitude of underperformance 
increases almost monotonically with interest rate, growing from 0.669% to 1.301%.  
 
IV. Time Pressure 
The previous evidence is consistent with the interpretation that time pressure leads investors to 
follow a simple rule of thumb: relying on interest rates to make quick decisions. This 
interpretation also implies that, when time pressure is stronger, investors should rely more on 
interest rates. In Section IV.A, we show that FulfillmentTime is indeed more sensitive to interest 
rate for faster loans. While this is consistent with our hypothesis, it does not necessarily establish 
a causal relation between time pressure and reliance on interest rate. Hence, in Section IV.B, we 
conduct a controlled experiment, which shows that time pressure causes subjects to choose loans 
with higher interest rates, exposing themselves to higher default risk. 
A. Empirical evidence  
Our hypothesis implies that for fast loans, FulfillmentTime should be even more sensitive to 
interest rate. To test this implication, we run quantile regressions of Ln(FulfillmentTime) on 
Interest Rate.    
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The main difference between an OLS regression and a quantile regression is that the 
former provides the conditional expected value of the dependent variable, while the latter 
provides the conditional quantile-𝜏 value of the dependent variable for a quantile-𝜏 regression, 
for 𝜏 ∈ (0,1).9 This implies that the coefficient of Interest Rate should be more negative for 
small values of 𝜏 (i.e., for faster loans). In other words, for faster loans, investors must rely more 
on their rule of thumb and are thus more responsive to interest rate.  
We run quantile regressions for 𝜏 = 10%, 25%, 75%, and 90%. The results are reported 
in columns (2) through (4) of Table 2. Consistent with our interpretation, the coefficient estimate 
for Interest Rate is negative and significant at the 1% level for all quantile regressions. Moreover, 
the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for Interest Rate decreases monotonically in 𝜏. The 
coefficient estimate for Interest Rate is -0.220 for the 10th quantile, -0.199 for the 25th quantile, -
0.173 for the 75th quantile, and -0.157 for the 90th quantile. In other words, when investors make 
decisions more quickly, as they do in the low quantiles of Ln(FulfillmentTime), they appear more 
responsive to interest rates.  
We plot the coefficient estimate for Interest Rate against quantile-𝜏 in Figure 2. The 
horizontal axis is quantile 𝜏. The vertical axis is the coefficient estimate for Interest Rate from 
the quantile-𝜏 regression of Ln(FulfillmentTime) on Interest Rate as in Table 2. The solid green 
line represents the estimate of the coefficient for Interest Rate from quantile regressions, and the 
grey region is the 95% confidence interval for the coefficient estimate. The figure shows that the 
coefficient estimate for Interest Rate increases gradually (becoming less negative) as 
Ln(FulfillmentTime) moves from the 5th to the 95th percentiles. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that when investors make decisions more quickly, they focus more on, and are 
hence more responsive to, interest rates. 
In contrast, for the other variables that Ln(FulfillmentTime) is sensitive to in the OLS 
regression (e.g., term, income, education, and homeownership), the coefficients in quantile 
regressions do not imply that Ln(FulfillmentTime) is more sensitive to those variables for smaller 
                                                          
9 For more details on quantile regressions, see, for example, Koenker (2005). 
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𝜏. Moreover, as in the OLS regression, the coefficient of HR is insignificant for all quintile 
regressions.    
B. Experimental evidence  
To complement the above evidence and establish a causal relation between time pressure and 
investors’ fixation on interest rates, we conducted the following experiment on January 15, 2017. 
We recruited 60 subjects from a first-year graduate class at the People’s Bank of China School of 
Finance (PBCSF), Tsinghua University and tasked them with selecting a loan to invest in from a 
pool of five loans. The five loans were chosen from the 16 loans listed on the Renrendai platform 
on November 4, 2013, an arbitrary day in the middle of our sample period. Among those loans, 
10 had the HR rating; 2 ended up in default. We randomly chose two non-HR loans that were 
fully repaid. We then randomly chose three HR loans, one of which ultimately defaulted. The 
fraction of HR loans and the default rate of these five loans are comparable to those of our full 
sample. Details of these five loans are reported in Panel A of Table 6. 
Before making their loan choices, all 60 subjects went through the same training session. 
Specifically, they were provided with Renrendai’s institutional background and the experiment 
procedure, as well as loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, and the eventual outcomes 
for 50 loans listed from October 4, 2013 to November 3, 2013, the 30-day period prior to the 
date on which the five loans in experiment are chosen. Those 50 loans were randomly selected 
from the 194 loans listed on Renrendai in that 30-day window. There were two screenshots of 
each loan. The first provided basic details about the loan and the borrower, and the second gave 
the loan’s repayment status. All subjects were given 30 minutes to study these 50 loans. They 
were encouraged to summarize the relationship between the loan details and repayment status. 
Participants were asked to think about what types of loans deliver higher returns and what types 
of loans are likely to default. Communication among subjects was prohibited.  
After the training session, subjects were randomly divided into two groups of 30. Those 
in the treatment group were asked to make their choices within 42 seconds (the 25th percentile of 
the FulfillmentTime in our sample). Those in the control group were asked to take a minimum of 
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180 seconds to make their decisions. To avoid interference, the two groups made investment 
decisions in different rooms. 
Facing time pressure, participants in the treatment group were more likely to resort to 
choosing loans based primarily on interest rates. Indeed, as shown in Panel B of Table 6, the 
average interest rate of the loans chosen by the treatment group was 16.27%, while the control 
group’s average interest rate was 15.07%. The difference is 1.20%, with a t-statistic of 3.02. 
Since loans with high interest rates tend to be those with HR ratings, participants in the treatment 
group were more likely to choose HR loans. In fact, 27% of the loans chosen by the treatment 
group had an HR rating. In contrast, only 7% of the loans chosen by the control group were HR 
loans. The t-statistic for the difference between the two values is 2.12. Naturally, the treatment 
group participants were more likely to experience a default: 23% of the loans chosen by the 
treatment group defaulted. In contrast, there were zero defaults among the loans chosen by the 
participants in the control group in this experiment. As a result, the treatment group 
underperformed the control group by 44 basis points (t=2.17). As a comparison, the last two 
rows report the results on term and loan size, and show that time pressure has no significant 
effect on investors’ preference for term and loan size.  
 
V. The Role of Salience  
When making quick decisions, people are more likely to rely on salient information and 
underreact to relevant but less salient information. In Section V.A, we first analyze the role of 
salience empirically, utilizing the introduction of a mobile app that changed the relative salience 
of the information on the Renrendai interface. To establish a causal relationship and analyze the 
potential for nudging investors to make better decisions, we conduct experiments in Section V.B. 
A. Empirical evidence: Mobile app 
On July 30, 2014, Renrendai launched its mobile app, which enabled individuals to invest 
through mobile phones. The screen of a mobile phone is smaller than that of a computer and 
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contains less information. As shown in Figure 3, the most salient aspect of a listed loan on the 
mobile app is its interest rate: not only it is located near the top and in the middle of the screen 
(easy-middle bias; see Reutskaja, et al., 2011, and Milosavljevic, et al., 2012), but it is also 
shown in orange (the only information not presented in black). Additionally, the constantly 
updated funding status shown on the screen (e.g., “99% Funded”) could pressure investors to 
make quick decisions. Interestingly, the credit rating of the borrower is not shown at all. Hence, 
one has to make extra effort to obtain the rating information. 
The introduction of the mobile app can be considered a shock to investors’ information 
environment. How does this shock affect investors’ decisions? Note that when investors make 
quick decisions, they tend to rely on a rule of thumb and focus on information that is prominent 
and easy to access. Hence, one hypothesis is that, by suppressing information such as borrowers’ 
credit ratings, the mobile interface further encourages investors to make quick decisions based on 
interest rates. The hypothesis translates into two predictions. First, mobile-based investors should 
make decisions more quickly than computer-based investors. Second, loans with higher interest 
rates should attract a larger fraction of mobile-based investors. 
To test the first prediction, we run a panel regression of Ln(DecisionTimeij) on Mobileij, 
where DecisionTimeij is investor i’s decision time for investing in loan j (from the time the loan j 
is listed to the time of investor i’s bid), and Mobileij is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if 
investor i’s bid for loan j is made through the mobile app, and 0 otherwise. As shown in column 
(1) of Panel A of Table 7, where the specification includes loan fixed effects, the coefficient of 
Mobileij is -0.146 (t=29.79). That is, mobile bidders are about 13.5% (=1-exp(-0.146)) faster than 
PC bidders on average.  
While this result is consistent with the hypothesis that the mobile interface makes 
investors bid more quickly, it can also be the result of selection: investors who tend to bid more 
quickly might have a higher likelihood of adopting the mobile app. To address this selection 
issue, we include investor fixed effects in the regression. As shown in the second column, the 
coefficient of Mobileij is -0.101 (t=13.24). That is, even the same investor tends to bid 9.61% 
(=1-exp(-0.101)) more quickly when using the mobile app. Moreover, we repeat this analysis on 
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a restricted sample consisting only of investors who used both the mobile and PC interfaces 
during our sample period. As shown in columns (3) and (4), in both specifications, the mobile 
app is associated with faster decisions. These results alleviate some concerns about the selection 
issue, but cannot completely rule it out. 10 Hence, in Section V.B, we conduct a controlled 
experiment to examine the causal effect of salience on investors’ decisions.  
To test the second prediction, we construct the variable MobileProportioni for each loan, 
which is the fraction of the investment in loan i made through the mobile app. We then regress it 
on Interest Rate, HR, and control variables. As shown in Panel B, the coefficient of Interest Rate 
is 0.675 (t=3.28). This is consistent with our interpretation that mobile investors pay more 
attention to interest rates.11 In contrast, the coefficient of HR is statistically insignificant.  
B. Experimental evidence: Nudging 
Our evidence in Table 3 shows that ignoring the information provided by credit ratings is costly 
to investors. A natural question is: can we nudge investors to improve their decisions? One 
potential nudge involves making credit rating information more prominent on the interface, so 
that investors might pay more attention to it and adjust their decisions accordingly. This is 
motivated by the evidence in the previous section that mobile app investors, who use an interface 
where interest rates are shown more prominently, are even more fixated on this variable. In this 
section, we conduct controlled experiments to examine whether the redesigned interface nudges 
investors to pay more attention to credit ratings.  
The experiment was conducted in two trials to obtain a sufficient sample size. We 
recruited 105 graduate students from PBCSF for the first trial on January 10, 2018 and 77 
                                                          
10 The specification with investor fixed effects addresses the concern that quick decision-makers may be more likely 
to adopt the mobile app, but does not address the concern of time variation of preference, i.e., the concern that an 
individual’s preference for speed may change over time, and he/she prefers to use a PC (the mobile app) when 
he/she makes slow (quick) decisions. 
11 Since the mobile app was introduced in July 2014, towards the end of our main sample period (Sept. 2012 to Dec. 
2014), we extend the sample period to March 2016 in this regression. We can utilize the 2015‒2016 data because 
this regression does not require information on payments and defaults. Finally, we also repeat the regression for our 
main sample; the coefficient estimate of Interest Rate is also positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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graduate students from the School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University for the 
second trial on March 19, 2018. The procedures for the two trials were the same.  
For each trial, subjects were divided randomly into three groups. The training session was 
the same as in Section IV.B, except that the screenshot of the loan information was presented 
differently across the three groups. For Group 1, the screenshot was the original PC interface, as 
in Figure 4. For Group 2, we modified the original interface by reducing the font size of the 
interest rate and moving it to a less prominent location, as shown in Figure 5. For Group 3, we 
modified the original interface by enlarging the font size of the credit rating, changing its color to 
orange, moving it to the top of the screen, and placing it to the immediate left of the interest rate, 
as shown in Figure 6.  
After the training session, subjects were asked to choose one of the same five loans that 
were shown in the experiment in Section IV.B. For all subjects, the interface for those five loans 
matched what they saw during their training session. To measure subjects’ thinking processes, 
we asked the following question at the end of the experiment: 
Which of the following factors do you value most when you make investment decisions?  
A. Interest Rate; B. Term; C. Amount; D. Credit Rating; E. Others. 
We hypothesize that, relative to the control group (i.e., Group 1), Group 2 subjects would 
pay less attention to interest rate and Group 3 subjects would pay more attention to credit rating. 
Moreover, both Groups 2 and 3 should make decisions more slowly, since the modified 
interfaces prompt subjects to be less fixated on interest rate and take other characteristics into 
account. 
Indeed, as shown in Panel A of Table 8, 39% of subjects in Group 1 chose interest rate as 
the most valued variable in their investment decisions. When interest rate was presented less 
prominently (for Group 2 subjects), only 20% of respondents indicated it as the most important 
variable in their decisions. The difference between these results is 19%, with a t-statistic of 2.29. 
In contrast, the differences in attention to other variables (HR, Amount, and Term) across the two 
groups are statistically insignificant. The difference in opinions across Groups 1 and 2 is 
somewhat reflected in their loan selections. As shown in Panel B, the average interest rate among 
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the loans chosen by Group 1 subjects was 17.32%, while the rate among the loans chosen by 
Group 2 subjects was 16.86%, although the difference between the two is statistically 
insignificant.  
The effects of salience on Group 3 subjects are much stronger. For example, as shown in 
Panel A, 23% of the subjects in Group 1 chose credit rating as the most important variable in 
their decisions. In contrast, when credit rating was highlighted prominently on the interface, 48% 
of the subjects stated that it was the most important variable in their decisions. The difference is 
25%, with a t-statistic of 2.96. This difference is clearly reflected in subjects’ loan choices and 
loan performance. As shown in Panel B, 63% of the loans chosen by Group 1 subjects had the 
HR rating, but only 48% of the loans chosen by Group 3 subjects had the HR rating. The t-
statistic for the difference is 1.76. To avoid loans with HR ratings, Group 3 subjects chose loans 
with slightly lower interest rates. The average interest rate was 17.32% for Group 1 and 16.53% 
for Group 3. The difference is 0.80% (t=2.27). Moreover, the default rate for the loans chosen by 
Group 3 subjects was much lower. While 31% of the loans chosen by Group 1 defaulted, only 10% 
of the loans chosen by Group 3 did. The difference is 21% (t=2.98). As a result, Group 3 subjects 
achieved higher returns than their counterparts in Group 1. The difference in IRR is 0.67% 
(t=2.13). That is, simply by highlighting credit ratings on the interface, we can nudge subjects to 
pay more attention to this variable, reducing their exposure to default risk and increasing their 
returns.  
Finally, the average decision time increases from 117.11 seconds for Group 1 to 148.54 
seconds for Group 2, and further climbs to 152.35 seconds for Group 3. This evidence is 
consistent with our hypothesis that when relevant information is more visible, investors slow 
down their decision process and try to incorporate the additional information into their decisions. 
 
VI. Firsthand Experience Effect 
In an environment where fast thinking prevails, do investors learn from experience and improve 
their decisions? Moreover, do investors with different kinds of experience learn differently when 
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they observe the same data? The latter question is partly motivated by the intriguing findings in 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2016), who show that people rely primarily on their personal 
experiences, rather than all historical data, in forming expectations. Hence, two people born in 
different cohorts may respond to the same data differently based on their experiences.  
In contrast, we examine whether a “participant” and an “observer” learn differently when 
they are presented with the same data, where the difference between a participant and an 
observer is whether they have “skin in the game.” Specifically, after observing the default of a 
loan, a participant (who has a position in the loan) may behave differently from an observer (who 
does not).  In Section VI.A, we examine empirically whether investors learn more from firsthand 
experience and show that this is the case. To assess potential explanations for the empirical 
results, we conduct experiments in Section VI.B. 
A. Empirical evidence  
We construct a proxy for an investor’s experience, CumBidit, which is the total number of bids 
investor i has made through the end of day t. As shown in Panel A of Table 9, the mean and 
median of CumBid are 50 and 11, respectively. To distinguish between observers and 
participants, we construct the dummy variable Default3Mit, which equals 1 if investor i has 
invested in a loan that defaulted in the previous 3 months, and 0 otherwise. As shown in Panel A, 
this variable has a mean of 0.252. DecisionTimeit is the duration between the time when a loan is 
listed and the time when investor i invests in the loan on day t. Panel A shows that the mean and 
median of DecisionTime are 635 seconds and 93 seconds, respectively. The table also reports the 
summary statistics of the characteristics of the loans funded by investor i on day t, such as 
Interest Rate, HR, and IRR – CD rate.   
To analyze the effect of learning on decisions, we first regress DecisionTime on CumBid. 
As shown in column (1), the coefficient of CumBid is 1.08 (t=2.45), suggesting that experience 
slows down investors’ decision making. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively small. 
On average, the experience of investing in an additional loan slows down an investor by 1.08 
seconds. Do investors learn differently from defaults on their own loans than from defaults on 
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others’ loans? To test this, we include Default3M in the regression. As shown in the second 
column, its coefficient is 79.216 (t=2.21). That is, after experiencing a loan default, an investor 
takes almost 80 seconds longer to make investment decisions.12 
Somewhat surprisingly, the third column shows that the coefficient of CumBid is 0.001 
(t=2.80), suggesting that investors with more experience tend to choose loans with slightly 
higher interest rates. However, by the end of our sample period, a representative investor has 
invested in three loans, and would thus select loans with interest rates that are just 0.3 basis 
points higher than those chosen by a new investor.13 On the other hand, experiencing a recent 
default has a stronger effect on an investor’s choices. Column (4) shows that the coefficient of 
Default3M is 0.035 (t=2.18). That is, the average interest rate of the loans chosen by investors 
who have experienced a default in the last 3 months is 3.5 basis points higher that of other loans.  
In the regression of HR on experience, shown in column (5), the coefficient of CumBid is 
insignificant. That is, on average, prior lending experience has a negligible effect on an 
investor’s willingness to invest in a high-risk loan. In contrast, experiencing a default firsthand 
has a much stronger effect. As shown in column (6), the coefficient of Default3M is -0.031 
(t=6.30). In other words, investors who have experienced a recent default are 3.1% less likely to 
invest in HR loans.  
Finally, to examine the effect of experience on an investor’s performance, we regress the 
IRR-CD rate of the loan chosen by an investor on the investor’s experience measures. As shown 
in column (7), the coefficient of CumBid is insignificant. That is, on average, experience has a 
negligible effect on the investor’s performance. However, in the last column, the coefficient of 
Default3M is 0.280 (t=6.42), suggesting that experiencing a recent default firsthand increases an 
investor’s return by 28 basis points per year.  
In summary, our evidence suggests that participants and observers appear to learn 
differently. After a firsthand experience of default, investors tend to significantly increase their 
                                                          
12 At least one loan defaulted in all rolling windows of 90 days over our sample period; that is, investors can always 
observe defaults of other investors’ loans over the previous three months. 
13 For all investors who have appeared in our sample, we calculate their CumBid on December 31, 2014, the last day 
of our sample. The mean and median of this sample of CumBid is 15 and 3, respectively.  
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decision time, choose loans with slightly higher interest rates while avoiding HR ratings, and 
receive higher returns. In contrast, for investors whose loans have not defaulted recently, the 
experience effects are significantly smaller or negligible.  
Why do participants learn differently from observers? One potential reason is the wealth 
effect. A participant suffers a loss from a default, while an observer does not. Hence, the two 
may have different responses to defaults. However, this effect is unlikely to be significant 
because the loss from a default is usually small. The mean and median bid sizes are ¥979 and 
¥500, respectively. Moreover, with the principal guarantee, investors only lose two interest 
payments, which are an order of magnitude smaller than the loan principals.  
Second, the results might be due to a selection effect. After suffering a loan default, an 
investor with low ability may choose to stop investing in future loans. As a result, the set of 
investors who choose to stay in the market after suffering a default should have a higher average 
ability.14 In principle, this selection effect may have contributed to our results. However, we 
expect its magnitude to be small: due to the principal guarantee, investors can still make a profit 
as long as borrowers make one payment, and so have little incentive to exit the market. Moreover, 
our experiment in the next section shows a significant difference between participants’ and 
observers’ learning where this selection effect is absent.  
Third, one might attribute the results to inattention. If a defaulting loan is not in an 
investor’s portfolio, it is likely that the investor would pay little attention to the default. 
Consequently, participants should respond more strongly than observers. While this 
interpretation is feasible, it is unlikely to explain the entire phenomenon. This is because, as 
shown in the next section, a similar participant vs. observer difference arises in our experiments, 
where all subjects are confronted with the outcomes of all loans, including the default event. 
B. Experimental evidence 
We recruited 68 undergraduate students from various departments and majors at Tsinghua 
University on June 23, 2018. All subjects went through a training session, which was the same as 
                                                          
14 See Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) for a recent study on this selection issue. 
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that employed in previous experiments. Subjects were then randomly divided into two groups of 
34.  
The subjects in the treatment group participated in two rounds of investments. In each 
round, subjects were asked to select one of five loans offered. The five loans for the first round 
were chosen from loans issued in the two-week-period after November 4, 2013, and include 
three HR loans, one of which ultimately defaulted. The five loans for the second round were the 
same as those used in the previous experiments. After subjects made their first-round choices, the 
outcomes of all five loans (i.e., their realized cash flows) were announced. Then, subjects were 
asked to choose one of the five loans in second round. After the second round of investment, we 
surveyed all subjects in the treatment group by asking the following questions: 
1. Which of the following factors do you value most when you make investment 
decisions?  
A. Interest Rate; B. Term; C. Amount; D. Credit Rating; E. Others. 
2. Please rate the extent to which you rely on intuition in making lending decisions on a 
scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest possible reliance on intuition and 7 
indicates the highest possible reliance on intuition. 
While the first question tries to elicit where investors direct their attention, the second question 
aims to estimate the extent to which subjects make decisions based on System 1, i.e., rely on 
their intuition.  
Our first test examines how experience affects the way investors make decisions. 
Specifically, we test whether investors focus on different variables across the two rounds of 
investments. Our surveys of the subjects in the treatment group were conducted after they 
observed the first-round investment outcomes and made their choices for the second round. If we 
had also surveyed them after the first round of investment decisions but before they learned the 
outcomes of the five loans, we would be able to measure the effect of experience on investors’ 
beliefs by comparing the results from the two surveys. However, we choose not to directly 
survey the subjects in our treatment group, since the survey itself might influence subjects’ 
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behavior in the second round. Instead, we let the subjects of the control group go through the 
same investment decisions for the first round. We survey them after they make investment 
decisions but before they learn the outcomes of the loans. Since subjects are randomly assigned 
to the treatment and control groups, this survey is also representative of the beliefs of the 
treatment-group subjects before they learn the outcome of their first round of investments. Hence, 
the difference between the results of our two surveys reflects the effect of the investment 
experience. To avoid interference, experiments were conducted separately for the treatment 
group and the control group. 
Panel A of Table 10 compares the survey results between the two groups. As shown in 
the first row, the percentage of subjects who select interest rate as the most important factor in 
their investment decisions is substantially lower for the treatment group than for the control 
group (23.53% vs. 50.00%). The difference between the two is 26.47%, with a t-statistic of 2.32. 
On the other hand, the percentage of subjects who select credit rating as the most important 
factor is substantially higher for the treatment group than for the control group (44.12% vs. 
20.59%). The t-statistic for the difference between these two percentages is 2.11. 
Moreover, after observing loan performance, subjects appear to rely less on intuition for 
their second round investment choices. The average score is 3.41/7 for the treatment group and 
4.41/7 for the control group. The t-stat for the difference between the two average scores is 2.85. 
In contrast, as shown in the last three rows, the treatment and control groups have similar 
opinions about loan term, loan amount, and other variables. In summary, consistent with our 
interpretation, subjects pay more attention to credit ratings and less attention to interest rates 
after they gain more investment experience.  
Our empirical evidence in the previous section shows that participants and observers 
learn differently. That is, an investor who experiences a recent default tends to choose loans with 
better credit ratings relative to investors who observe others experiencing defaults. Our 
experiment complements this evidence in two ways. First, it allows us to analyze what investors 
think through surveys. Second, it helps to narrow down potential interpretations of our empirical 
results.   
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In particular, we run cross-sectional regressions based on survey data from the subjects in 
the treatment group. In the specification in column (1) of Panel B, the dependent variable is 
Intuition Score and the independent variable is Defaulti, which equals 1 if the loan chosen by 
investor i in the previous round defaults and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of Default is -1.164 
(t=2.41), suggesting that, relative to the investors who did not experience a default in the first 
round, those whose loan defaulted rely less on their intuition when making investments in the 
second round. In column (2), the dependent variable is Credit Ratingit, which is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if investor i chooses credit rating as the most important factor for his 
decision and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of Default is 0.458 (t=2.52), suggesting that, relative to 
the investors who did not experience a default in the first round, those who did are 45.8% more 
likely to choose credit rating as the most important factor in the second round. We run a similar 
regression for interest rate. As shown in column (3), the coefficient of Default is -0.320 (t=2.00), 
suggesting that the subjects who experienced a default in the first round are 32% less likely to 
choose interest rate as the most important factor for the second round investment. Finally, the 
last two columns show that default experience does not significantly affect subjects’ views on 
loan term and amount.  
Panel C shows that the subjects’ investment choices appear consistent with the survey 
evidence in Panel B. Specifically, we run cross-sectional regressions based on the loan choices of 
the subjects in the treatment group. The first column shows that, relative to the investors who did 
not experience a default in the first round, those who did spend an extra 44.35 seconds (t=3.64) 
making decisions in the second round. Similarly, column (2) shows that subjects who 
experienced a default in the first round are 44% less likely to choose loans with an HR rating. 
Since non-HR loans have lower interest rates, as shown in column (3), the average interest rate of 
the loans chosen by subjects who experienced a default in the first round is 1.80% lower than 
that of loans chosen by subjects who did not experience a default. Column (4) shows that the 
effect of experiencing a default on IRR is positive, but statistically insignificant. Finally, the last 
two columns show that the effect is insignificant for loan term and amount. 
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These results not only corroborate our empirical evidence, but also shed light on its 
potential interpretations. In particular, our experimental evidence suggests that inattention, a 
likely contributor, cannot explain the entire firsthand experience effect. In our experiments, all 
subjects are informed about the performance of all loans, including the default event. We 
conjecture that participants and observers process the default information differently. Facing a 
default on one’s own loans, participants are more likely to reexamine their decision processes 
and, consequently, improve their future decisions.  
This finding adds to the literature on how experience affects belief formation along two 
dimensions. First, we show that firsthand experience plays a special role in affecting an 
investor’s decisions. This is consistent with the findings in Andersen, Hanspal, and Nielsen 
(2018), which show that investors who suffered losses from investments in banks that defaulted 
following the 2008 financial crisis are more likely to shy away from risk. One key difference 
between our studies is the nature of the firsthand experience. The experience in Andersen et al. 
(2018) is based on shocks that are rare but can cause substantial losses. In response, investors 
who experienced the shock later completely avoided risk. In our study, however, the negative 
experience comprises more frequent but smaller shocks. Instead of avoiding risk altogether, 
investors in our study pay more attention to it and hence improve their future investments. More 
importantly, our experiment suggests that the firsthand experience effect cannot be attributed 
entirely to inattention. An investor is less responsive to other investors’ losses not because she is 
not aware of such losses but, perhaps, because she is less likely to learn from others’ mistakes 
when planning her investments.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes how investment decisions are made in a real financial market when fast 
thinking prevails. Under time pressure, investors in an online P2P lending market appear to focus 
mostly on interest rates without sufficiently examining other information such as credit ratings. 
This simple rule of thumb is sensible, since interest rates and loan performance are highly 
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correlated in this market. Consistent with this interpretation, our empirical and experimental 
evidence suggests that investors are more reliant on this rule of thumb when they experience 
more time pressure.  
Moreover, considering borrowers’ credit ratings, which are freely available on the trading 
interface, can significantly improve investment decisions. Through experiments, we show that by 
making credit rating information more salient, we can “nudge” investors into paying more 
attention to credit ratings and hence substantially improve their investment returns.  
Finally, firsthand experience matters for learning: After experiencing a loan default 
personally, investors tend to increase their decision times and avoid loans with “High Risk” 
ratings, obtaining higher future returns. In contrast, after observing others experiencing a default, 
the effects are significantly smaller or negligible. Our empirical and experimental evidence 
suggests that this result cannot be fully explained by inattention. Our conjecture is that the 
psychological responses to firsthand experience are stronger than responses to other experiences.  
In an increasingly digitized world, many financial decisions, including equity investments 
and portfolio choices for retirement, are made with a few swipes of a thumb. The sheer amount 
and speed of information may overwhelm investors, leading them to ignore details that are 
important for decision-making. Our research sheds light on investors’ behavioral biases in a 
context of limited time and attention. It can help investors avoid the trap of fast thinking and 
improve their investment decisions. 
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Figure 1. Computer screenshot of a sample loan   
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Figure 2.  Marginal effect of interest rate on fulfillment time at different quantiles 
 
The horizontal axis is the quantile of Ln(FulfillmentTime) from 0.05 to 0.95. The vertical axis is the 
coefficient estimate for Interest Rate from the quantile regression of Ln(FulfillmentTime) on Interest 
Rate and a list of control variables, as in Table 2. The solid green line is the coefficient estimate for 
Interest Rate from quantile regressions and the grey region is the 95% confidence interval for the 
coefficient estimate for Interest Rate.  
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Figure 3. Mobile App screenshot of a sample loan  
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Figure 4. Computer screenshot of a sample loan for Group 1 (original)  
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Figure 5. Computer screenshot of a sample loan for Group 2 (interest rate in a smaller font)
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Figure 6. Computer screenshot of a sample loan for Group 3 (credit rating in a larger font) 
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Table 1. Data description 
 
Panel A lists the definitions of our main variables. Panel B reports their summary statistics, and Panel C 
compares the characteristics of fast loans and other loans.  
 
Panel A. Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Interest Rate (%) The interest rate of the loan. 
Ln(Amount) (¥) The natural log of the loan amount.  
Term (months) 
The term of the loan. At Renrendai, a borrower can choose from eight terms: 3 
months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months, 15 months, 18 months, 24 months, or 36 
months.  
FulfillmentTime (seconds) The time interval between the beginning and ending times of a loan’s funding process. 
IRR (%) The internal rate of return (IRR) for the loan.  
Default 
equals 1 if the loan defaults and 0 otherwise. Both overdue loans and advanced loans 
are classified as defaulted. Overdue loans are loans that have been overdue for less 
than 30 days; advanced loans are loans that have been overdue for more than 30 
days, which Renrendai has repaid to the borrowers. 
Rm The rate of return in the A-share market in China over the past 20 trading days. 
Rf (%) The annualized rate of return of time deposits with the same term as the loan. 
HR Takes a value of 1 if the borrower’s credit rating is HR (High Risk) and 0 otherwise. 
Male equals 1 if the borrower is male and 0 otherwise. 
Age (in years) Age of the borrower. 
Bachelor equals 1 if the borrower’s highest degree is a bachelor’s degree and 0 otherwise. 
MasterOrHigher equals 1 if the borrower’s highest degree is a master’s degree or higher and 0 otherwise. 
Employ(3–5yrs) equals 1 if the borrower has work experience of 3 to 5 years and 0 otherwise. 
Employ(5yrs+) equals 1 if the borrower has work experience of more than 5 years and 0 otherwise. 
Income(¥5,000–10,000) equals 1 if the borrower’s monthly income is between ¥5,000 and 10,000 and 0 otherwise. 
Income(¥10,000–20,000) equals 1 if the borrower’s monthly income is between ¥10,000 and 20,000 and 0 otherwise. 
Income(¥20,000–50,000) equals 1 if the borrower’s monthly income is between ¥20,000 and 50,000 and 0 otherwise. 
Income(¥50,000+) equals 1 if the borrower’s monthly income is above ¥50,000 and 0 otherwise. 
House equals 1 if the borrower owns a house and 0 otherwise. 
Mortgage equals 1 if the borrower has an unpaid mortgage and 0 otherwise. 
Car equals 1 if the borrower owns a car and 0 otherwise. 
CarLoan equals 1 if the borrower has an unpaid car loan and 0 otherwise. 
Bidt equals 1 if the investor invests in month t and 0 otherwise. 
Ln(FulfillmentTime)t  
(seconds) 
The average of the natural log of one plus the time interval between the beginning 
and ending time of a loan’s funding process in month t.  
ProportionFastBidst (%) The proportion of fast loans among all loans made by an investor in month t. 
CumBidit The cumulative number of loans made by an investor i up to day t. 
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Panel B. Summary statistics (N=10,385) 
Variable Mean S.D. p1 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
Loan characteristics:          
Interest Rate (%) 12.70 2.20 10 10 11 12 13 15 20 
Amount (¥’000) 25.37 39.67 3.00 5.00 8.00 14.00 27.00 50.00 200.00 
Ln(Amount) (¥) 9.63 0.92 8.01 8.52 8.99 9.55 10.20 10.82 12.21 
Term (months) 10.30 7.08 3 3 6 9 12 18 36 
FulfillmentTime (seconds) 291 1,581 4 23 42 80 180 480 2,972 
Ln(FulfillmentTime)  4.54 1.27 1.61 3.18 3.76 4.39 5.20 6.18 8.00 
IRR (%) 10.82 3.80 0 6.43 8.02 10.77 13.00 15.15 21.97 
IRR – CD Rate (%) 7.89 3.81 -2.80 3.68 5.07 7.77 10.20 12.20 19.16 
Default 0.18 0.38 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
          
Market Conditions:          
Rm 0.037 0.068 -0.117 -0.039 -0.004 0.025 0.063 0.137 0.247 
Rf (%) 2.924 0.355 2.55 2.6 2.75 2.8 3 3 4.25 
 
Borrower characteristics: 
HR 0.712 0.453 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Male 0.873 0.333 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 32.889 7.024 23 25 28 32 37 43 52 
Bachelor 0.298 0.457 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
MasterOrHigher 0.023 0.151 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Employ(3–5yrs) 0.220 0.414 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Employ(5yrs+) 0.347 0.476 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Income(¥5,000–10,000) 0.267 0.442 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Income(¥10,000–20,000) 0.140 0.348 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Income(¥20,000–50,000) 0.143 0.350 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Income(¥50,000+) 0.130 0.336 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
House 0.555 0.497 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Mortgage 0.217 0.412 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Car 0.408 0.492 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
CarLoan 0.080 0.272 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Panel C. Average characteristics of fast loans vs. other loans 
 
 
Fast  Other  Fast minus Other 
Variable:  (N =2,644)  (N =7,741)  Diff t-stat 
Loan characteristics:       
Interest Rate (%) 13.71  12.36  1.351 28.24*** 
Amount (¥) 13,873  29,299  -15,427 -17.52*** 
Ln(Amount) (¥) 9.276  9.752  -0.476 -23.57*** 
Term (months) 10.57  10.21  0.359 2.25** 
FulfillmentTime (seconds) 25.71  381.52  -355.81 -10.04*** 
Ln(FulfillmentTime)  3.127  5.025  -1.897 -87.87*** 
IRR(%) 11.67  10.53  1.141 13.44*** 
IRR – CD Rate (%) 8.718  7.609  1.108 13.01*** 
Default 0.198  0.167  0.031 3.55*** 
       
Borrower characteristics:       
HR 0.787  0.686  0.101 10.03*** 
Male 0.882  0.869  0.013 1.75* 
Age (years) 31.31  33.43  -2.11 13.48*** 
Bachelor 0.291  0.301  -0.01 0.96 
MasterOrHigher 0.022  0.024  -0.002 0.69 
Employ(3–5yrs) 0.208  0.224  -0.016 1.69* 
Employ(5yrs+) 0.304  0.361  -0.057 5.28*** 
Income(¥5,000–10,000) 0.31  0.253  0.057 5.75*** 
Income(¥10,000–20,000) 0.127  0.145  -0.018 2.23** 
Income(¥20,000–50,000) 0.095  0.16  -0.065 8.27*** 
Income(¥50,000+) 0.061  0.153  -0.092 12.33*** 
House 0.476  0.582  -0.106 9.50*** 
Mortgage 0.205  0.221  -0.016 1.66* 
Car 0.292  0.448  -0.156 14.25*** 
CarLoan 0.056   0.089   -0.033 5.27*** 
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Table 2. Fulfillment Time vs. Interest Rate and HR: OLS and Quantile Regressions 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression (column (1)) and quantile regressions (columns (2) 
through (5) for the 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles, respectively). The dependent variable is 
Ln(FulfillmentTime). All independent variables are defined in Table 1. Verifications fixed effects are 
captured by dummy variables indicating whether Renrendai verified the borrower’s credit report, ID, 
employment, income, home deed, car title, marriage certificate, education diploma, mobile phone, Weibo 
account, address, and video interview. All specifications include week fixed effects, day-of-week fixed 
effects, and hour-of-day fixed effects.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles in the OLS regression. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 OLS 10th Quantile 25th Quantile 75th Quantile 90
th 
Quantile 
Interest Rate -0.206*** -0.220*** -0.199*** -0.173*** -0.157*** 
 (-19.55) (-22.40) (-40.56) (-30.08) (-17.46) 
Ln(Amount) -1.357*** -0.105 -0.829*** -1.772*** -2.115*** 
 (-7.86) (-0.32) (-5.09) (-9.27) (-7.09) 
Ln(Amount)Squared 0.097*** 0.028* 0.065*** 0.117*** 0.135*** 
 (10.64) (1.72) (7.85) (12.07) (8.90) 
Term 0.026*** 0.029** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.026** 
 (3.57) (2.47) (3.72) (2.98) (2.34) 
Rm 0.066 -0.057 -0.172 0.075 0.295 
 (0.03) (-0.05) (-0.30) (0.11) (0.28) 
Rf -0.118 -0.211 -0.051 -0.085 -0.118 
 (-0.85) (-0.90) (-0.44) (-0.62) (-0.55) 
HR -0.036 -0.038 0.037 -0.015 -0.072 
 (-1.28) (-0.70) (1.37) (-0.49) (-1.47) 
Male -0.003 0.003 0.011 0.028 -0.036 
 (-0.13) (0.06) (0.42) (0.89) (-0.72) 
Age -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.10) (-0.36) (1.00) (-0.64) (-0.24) Bachelor -0.031 -0.054 -0.024 -0.025 -0.036 
 (-1.58) (-1.28) (-1.14) (-1.00) (-0.93) 
MasterOrHigher -0.130*** -0.032 -0.069 -0.155** -0.219** 
 (-3.10) (-0.27) (-1.14) (-2.18) (-1.97) 
Employ(3–5yrs) -0.023 0.012 0.000 -0.025 -0.071 
 (-1.10) (0.25) (0.01) (-0.89) (-1.61) 
Employ(5yrs+) -0.001 0.030 -0.009 0.020 -0.016 
 (-0.03) (0.64) (-0.40) (0.75) (-0.36) 
Income(¥5,000–10,000) -0.045** -0.020 -0.048** -0.024 0.004 
 (-2.16) (-0.40) (-1.99) (-0.85) (0.09) 
Income(¥10,000–20,000) -0.009 -0.008 -0.028 0.043 0.108* 
 (-0.27) (-0.13) (-0.92) (1.18) (1.91) 
Income(¥20,000–50,000) -0.021 -0.043 -0.015 0.017 0.022 
 (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.45) (0.43) (0.35) 
Income(¥50,000+) -0.040 -0.027 -0.021 0.027 0.036 
 (-0.91) (-0.35) (-0.54) (0.61) (0.51) 
House -0.062*** -0.059 -0.044* -0.057** -0.060 
 (-2.78) (-1.23) (-1.83) (-2.03) (-1.36) Mortgage -0.024 -0.012 0.000 -0.006 -0.049 
 (-1.02) (-0.23) (0.01) (-0.20) (-1.05) Car -0.003 -0.046 0.003 0.012 -0.010 
 (-0.10) (-0.86) (0.10) (0.38) (-0.20) CarLoan 0.026 0.083 0.058 0.029 0.030 
 (0.78) (1.16) (1.63) (0.69) (0.46) Constant 14.064*** 7.893*** 10.851*** 16.271*** 18.411*** 
 (15.08) (4.44) (12.21) (15.60) (11.31)       
Verification Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Hour-of-Day Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 10,385 10,385 10,385 10,385 10,385 
Adjusted/Pseudo- R2 0.575 0.328 0.352 0.423 0.454 
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Table 3. Loan Performance 
 
This table reports the estimates of regressions of IRRi – CD Rate on Interest Rate, HR, and control 
variables, where IRRi is the internal rate of return of loan i and CD Rate is the bank deposit rate in the 
same month as the loan and with the same term. Verifications fixed effects are described in Table 2. All 
specifications include week fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, and hour-of-day fixed effects. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by week. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: IRR – CD Rate (%) 
 (1) (2) 
Interest Rate 0.804*** 0.809*** 
 (31.78) (32.13) HR -1.109*** -1.076*** 
 (-19.34) (-15.74) Ln(Amount) -0.297*** -0.303*** 
 (-8.08) (-8.21) Term -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 (-21.05) (-20.71) 
Rm -0.960 -1.052 
 (-0.75) (-0.82) Male -0.166** -0.151** 
 (-2.59) (-2.36) Age -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (-3.93) (-3.61) Bachelor 0.347*** 0.343*** 
 (6.97) (6.99) MasterOrHigher 0.762*** 0.784*** 
 (5.09) (5.30) Employ(3–5yrs) 0.089 0.089 
 (1.42) (1.44) Employ(5yrs+) 0.101 0.115 
 (1.40) (1.55) Income(¥5,000–10,000) -0.112* -0.106* 
 (-1.74) (-1.67) Income(¥10,000–20,000) -0.057 -0.054 
 (-0.76) (-0.72) Income(¥20,000–50,000) 0.016 -0.006 
 (0.20) (-0.07) Income(¥50,000+) -0.015 -0.032 
 (-0.17) (-0.35) House -0.099 -0.067 
 (-1.52) (-0.99) Mortgage 0.311*** 0.332*** 
 (4.02) (4.26) Car 0.165*** 0.192*** 
 (2.78) (2.63) CarLoan -0.056 -0.049 
 (-0.54) (-0.47) Constant 5.025*** 5.223*** 
 (5.85) (5.98)    
Verification Fixed Effects NO YES 
Week Fixed Effects YES YES 
Day-of-week Fixed Effects YES YES 
Hour-of-day Fixed Effects YES YES 
   
No. of Obs. 10,385 10,385 
R-squared 0.599 0.602 
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Table 4. Loan Default 
 
This table reports the estimates of a Cox proportional hazards model, where the survival time is the time 
elapsed from the moment when the loan gets funded to the moment when the loan defaults or gets repaid. 
The dependent variable is Defaultit, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if loan i defaults in month t 
and zero otherwise. Verifications fixed effects are described in Table 2. All specifications include week 
fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, and hour-of-day fixed effects. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by week. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Default 
 (1) (2) 
Interest Rate 0.109*** 0.108*** 
 (6.71) (6.60) HR 2.011*** 2.012*** 
 (8.26) (9.03) Ln(Amount) 0.139*** 0.170*** 
 (2.90) (3.54) Term 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (16.15) (14.98) 
Rm 3.306** 3.512** 
 (2.11) (2.24) Male 0.213** 0.195** 
 (2.42) (2.25) Age 0.024*** 0.020*** 
 (5.28) (4.68) Bachelor -0.585*** -0.532*** 
 (-10.00) (-9.08) MasterOrHigher -1.199*** -1.090*** 
 (-4.28) (-4.01) Employ(3–5yrs) -0.042 -0.079 
 (-0.68) (-1.25) Employ(5yrs+) -0.158** -0.190*** 
 (-2.41) (-2.83) Income(¥5,000–10,000) 0.179*** 0.178*** 
 (3.14) (3.03) Income(¥10,000–20,000) 0.233*** 0.244*** 
 (2.77) (2.91) Income(¥20,000–50,000) 0.492*** 0.538*** 
 (4.92) (5.49) Income(¥50,000+) 0.618*** 0.645*** 
 (5.62) (5.92) House 0.108* 0.111* 
 (1.70) (1.74) Mortgage -0.436*** -0.429*** 
 (-6.16) (-5.83) Car -0.234*** -0.303*** 
 (-3.30) (-3.37) CarLoan 0.106 0.091 
 (0.91) (0.81)    
Verification Fixed Effects NO YES 
Week Fixed Effects YES YES 
Day-of-week Fixed Effects YES YES 
Hour-of-day Fixed Effects YES YES 
No. of Obs. 10,385 10,385 
Wald chi2 3.04e11 8.64e8 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5. Performance of HR vs. non-HR Loans  
This table reports the performance of HR and non-HR loans. For each week, we sort loans into five 
quintiles based on their interest rates. Then, we calculate the principal-value-weighted average of IRR – 
CD Rate for HR and non-HR loans, both for each quintile and for the overall sample. The first row reports 
the time-series average of these weekly averages for the overall sample, and rows two through six report 
the results for quintiles one through five, respectively. The last row reports the difference in differences. 
T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted with 24 
lags. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable: IRR – CD Rate (%) 
 
HR Loans 
(1) 
Non-HR loans 
(2) 
Diff 
(2) - (1) 
Full Sample 8.219 9.340 1.121*** 
   (5.26) 
Quintile 1 (high) 9.672 10.983 1.301*** 
   (7.29) 
Quintile 2 8.165 9.526 1.399*** 
   (4.09) 
Quintile 3 7.882 9.190 1.258*** 
   (3.92) 
Quintile 4 7.994 8.766 0.769*** 
   (4.26) 
Quintile 5 (low) 7.507 8.183 0.669*** 
   (4.80) 
Diff-in-diff (1)-(5)   0.632*** 
   (3.43) 
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Table 6. Time pressure experiment 
 
The experiment was conducted on January 15, 2017. We recruited 60 subjects from a first-year graduate 
class at the People’s Bank of China School of Finance (PBCSF), Tsinghua University. All subjects went 
through the training session described in Section IV.B. They were then instructed to select one of five 
offered loans to invest in. Subjects were randomly divided into two groups of 30. The subjects in the 
treatment group were asked to select a loan within 42 seconds, while those in the control group were 
asked to take a minimum of 180 seconds to make their selection. Panel A reports the details of the five 
loans from which the subjects chose. Panel B records the average characteristics of the selected loans for 
the treatment and control groups. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Details of the five loans 
Variable Mean Loan 1 Loan 2 Loan 3 Loan 4 Loan 5 
Borrower characteristics:       
Interest Rate (%) 16.8 20 15 16 15 18 
Amount (¥ ’000) 12.4 10 10 12 5 25 
Term (Months) 15 12 24 12 3 24 
IRR(%) 15.40 12.99 15 16 15 18 
Default 0.2 1 0 0 0 0 
Borrower characteristics:       
HR 0.6 1 0 1 0 1 
Age (in years) 32 35 36 32 29 28 
Bachelor 0.8 0 1 1 1 1 
MasterOrHigher 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Employ(3-5yrs) 0.4 0 0 0 1 1 
Employ(5yrs+) 0.2 0 1 0 0 0 
Income(¥5,000-10,000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Income(¥10,000-20,000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Income(¥20,000-50,000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Income(¥50,000+) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
House 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mortgage 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Car 0.2 0 0 0 1 0 
CarLoan 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Panel B. Characteristics of loans selected by the treatment and control groups 
Variable: Treatment group Control group Diff  
 (N=30) (N=30) (Treatment - control)  
Interest rate (%) 
   
16.27 15.07 1.20***  
   (3.02)  
HR 0.27 0.07 0.20**  
   (2.12)  
Default 0.23 0.00 0.23***  
   (2.97)  
IRR (%) 14.63 15.07 -0.44**  
   (2.17)  
Term (months) 14.90 14.10 0.80  
   (0.32)  
Amount (¥) 9,000 7,700 1,300  
   (1.57)  
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Table 7. Introduction of Mobile App 
 
Panel A reports the estimate of a panel regression of Ln(DecisionTimeij) on Mobileij, where 
DecisionTimeij is investor i’s decision time for investing in loan j and Mobileij is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if investor i’s bid for loan j is made through the mobile app and 0 if it is made using a computer. 
The first two columns report the estimates based on the overall sample; the last two columns are based on 
the subsample of investors who used both the mobile app and a PC in their bidding during our sample 
period. Panel B reports the estimates of a regression of MobileProportioni, which is the fraction of the 
investment in loan i that comes from the mobile app, on Interest Rate and control variables. This 
regression is based on an extended sample period from Sept. 2012 to March 2016. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by week. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Mobile bidders are faster 
Dependent variable: Ln(DecisionTime) 
 Overall sample  
 Subsample  
(users of both mobile and PC) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Mobile -0.146*** -0.101***  -0.130*** -0.111*** 
 (-29.79) (-13.24)  (-16.07) (-11.40) 
Constant 4.437*** 4.404***  4.201*** 4.201*** 
 (2,620.56) （3.43） 
 (1,088.55) （3.45） 
No. of Obs. 204,872 196,165  69,358 68,408 
R-squared 0.797 0.832  0.780 0.815 
Investor Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes 
Loan Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Fractions of bids from the mobile app 
 MobileProportion 
Interest Rate 0.675*** 
 (3.28) 
Ln(Amount) -1.383*** 
 (-4.42) Term 0.188* 
 (1.85) 
Rm -6.488 
 (-0.93) 
Rf -1.579 
 (-0.91) 
HR 0.411 
 (1.42) 
Age -0.026 
 (-1.28) 
Bachelor 0.562*** 
 (2.66) 
MasterOrHigher 0.511 
 (0.94) 
Employ(3–5yrs) 0.011 
 (0.04) Employ(5yrs+) -0.034 
 (-0.15) Income(¥5,000–10,000) 0.416 
 (1.33) Income(¥10,000–20,000) 0.644 
 (1.30) Income(¥20,000–50,000) 0.891* 
 (1.98) 
Income(¥50,000+) 2.297*** 
 (4.48) 
House 0.044 
 (0.14) 
Mortgage -0.724*** 
 (-2.90) 
Car -0.300 
 (-0.95) 
CarLoan -0.080 
 (-0.21) 
Constant 14.164 
 (1.23)   
Verification Fixed Effects YES 
Week Fixed Effects YES 
Day-of-Week Fixed Effects YES 
Hour-of-Day Fixed Effects YES 
  
No. of Obs. 16,533 
R-squared 0.875 
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Table 8. Experiment on the effect of salience 
The experiment was conducted in two rounds. We recruited 105 graduate students from PBCSF 
for the first round on January 10, 2018 and 77 graduate students from the School of Management and 
Engineering, Nanjing University for the second round on March 19, 2018. The procedures for the two 
rounds of experiments were the same. For each round, subjects were divided randomly into three groups. 
The training session was the same as in Section IV.B, except that the screenshot of the loan information is 
presented differently across the three groups. For Group 1, the screenshot was the original PC interface, 
as in Figure 4. For Group 2, we modified the original interface by reducing the font size of the interest 
rate and moving it to a less prominent location, as shown in Figure 5. For Group 3, we modified the 
original interface by enlarging the font size of the credit rating, changing its color to orange, and moving 
it to the top of the screen, as shown in Figure 6. After the training session, subjects were asked to choose 
one out of same five loans that were shown in the experiment in Table 6. For all subjects, the format of 
the interface for those five loans matched what they saw during the training session. We asked the 
following question at the end of the experiment: 
Which of the following factors do you value most when you make investment decisions?  
A. Interest Rate; B. Term; C. Amount; D. Credit Rating; E. Others. 
Panel A compares the most valued variables across the three groups. It reports the fraction of subjects who 
choose each variable as the most important factor in their decisions. Panel B reports the average value of each 
variable among the loans chosen by each group. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Comparison of the most valued variables in the survey 
 Variable: Group 1 Group 2  Group 3  Diff 
 
Diff 
  (N=65) (N=56) (N=61) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) 
Interface Original Smaller interest rate Larger credit rating   
Interest Rate 0.39 0.20 0.26 0.19** 0.12 
    (2.29) (1.47) 
HR 0.23 0.36 0.48 -0.13 -0.25*** 
        (-1.53) (-2.96) 
Amount 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 
    (0.84) (1.34） 
Term 0.11 0.18 0.03 -0.07 0.07 
    (1.12) (1.64) 
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Panel B. Comparison of loan choices  
 Variable: Group 1 Group 2  Group 3  Diff  Diff  
 (N=65) (N=56) (N=61) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) 
Interface Original Smaller interest 
t  
Larger credit 
ti  
  
Interest Rate (%) 17.32 16.86 16.53 0.47 0.80** 
    (1.21) (2.27) 
HR 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.10 0.16* 
    (1.06) (1.76) 
Default 0.31 0.25 0.10 0.06 0.21*** 
        (0.70) (2.98) 
IRR (%) 15.17 15.11 15.84 0.06 -0.67** 
    (0.19) (-2.13) 
Amount 12,492 11,857 13,541 635 -1,049 
    (0.51) (-0.75) 
Term 14.35 16.13 16.03 -1.77 -1.68 
    (-1.20) (-1.07) 
DecisionTime 
(seconds) 117.11 148.54 152.35 -31.43* -35.25** 
    (-1.74) (-2.22) 
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Table 9. Experience and investment choices  
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the main variables. CumBidit is the total number of bids investor i has made through the end of day t. 
Default3Mit is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if investor i has invested in a loan that defaulted in the previous 3 months, and 0 otherwise. 
DecisionTimeit is the duration between the time when a loan is listed and the time when investor i bids to invest in the loan during week t. If an 
investor bids on multiple loans during week t, we use the principal-weighted average as the decision time. Panel B reports the results of 
regressions of various dependent variables on CumBid and DecisionTime. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Standard errors are clustered by week. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
Variable: No. of Obs. Mean S.D. p1 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
CumBid 114,975 50.34 106.56 1 1 3 11 43 141 629 
Default3M  114,975 0.252 0.434 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
DecisionTime (seconds) 114,975 635 2,771 9 21 38 93 300 1,055 12,451 
InterestRate (%) 114,975 12.703 1.542 10 11 11.98 13 13 15 18 
HR 114,975 0.524 0.462 0 0 0 0.6 1 1 1 
IRR-CD rate (%) 114,975 8.647 3.211 -0.46 4.56 7.91 9.18 10.20 11.57 15.20 
 
 
Panel B. Firsthand experience in default and loan choices 
Dependent variable: Decision Time Decision Time Interest Rate Interest Rate HR HR IRR-CD rate IRR-CD rate 
CumBid 1.080** 0.900** 0.001*** 0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (2.45) (2.26) (2.80) (2.60) (-0.96) (0.08) (1.00) (-0.20) 
Default3M  79.216**  0.035**  -0.031***  0.280*** 
  (2.21)  (2.18)  (-6.30)  (6.42) 
Constant 984.354*** 982.488*** 13.288*** 13.287*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 10.138*** 10.132*** 
 (10.10) (10.05) (603.02) (604.41) (36.81) (36.78) (315.68) (302.36) 
No. of Obs. 114,975 114,975 114,975 114,975 114,975 114,975 114,975 114,975 
R-squared 0.435 0.435 0.497 0.497 0.391 0.391 0.451 0.452 
Investor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10. Experiment on learning 
 
We recruited 68 undergraduate students from various departments and majors at Tsinghua University on 
June 23, 2018. They were randomly divided into two groups of 34. All subjects went through the same 
training session, described in Section IV.B, and participated in two rounds of investment decisions. 
During each round, all subjects were shown the same five loans and asked to select one. After the first-
round choices, the outcomes of all five loans (i.e., their realized cash flows) were announced to the 
subjects in the treatment group, but not those in the control group. Then, all subjects were shown another 
five loans and asked to select one. After the second round of selections, we surveyed the subjects in the 
treatment group by asking the following questions: 
1. Which of the following factors do you value most when you make investment decisions?  
A. Interest Rate; B. Term; C. Amount; D. Credit Rating; E. Others. 
2. Please rate the extent to which you rely on intuition in making lending decisions on a scale of 1 to 7, 
where 1 indicates the lowest possible reliance on intuition and 7 indicates the highest possible reliance 
on intuition. 
In the control group, we asked participants the same questions after they made the first round of selections 
and before their second round of selections. Panel A contrasts the survey results across the treatment and 
control groups. Panel B reports the estimates of the regressions of the treatment group’s survey results on 
Default, which equals one if the loan selected by a subject in the first round defaults and zero otherwise. 
In column (1), the dependent variable is the intuition score. In columns (2), the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable, which equals one if a subject chooses credit rating as the most valued factor and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variables in columns (3) though (5) are also dummy variables and are similarly 
defined. Panel C reports the estimates of the regressions of the treatment group’s loan choices on Default. 
The dependent variables are labeled at the top of each column. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Comparison of the survey results across the treatment and control groups 
Variable: Treatment group Control group Diff 
 (N=34) (N=34) (Treatment - control) 
Interest Rate (%) 23.53 50.00 -26.47** 
   (2.32) 
Credit Rating (%) 44.12 20.59 23.53** 
   (2.11) 
Intuition Score 3.41 4.41 -1.00*** 
   (2.85) 
Term (%) 8.82 17.65 -8.82 
   (1.07) 
Amount (%) 20.59 11.76 8.82 
   (0.98) 
Others (%) 2.94 2.94 0 
   (0.00) 
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Table 10 Panel B. Survey results and default experience for the treatment group 
Dependent Intuition Score Credit Rating Interest Rate Term Amount 
variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Default -1.164** 0.458** -0.320* 0.031 -0.129 
 (2.41) (2.52) (2.00) (0.27) (0.80) 
Constant 3.720*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 0.080 0.240*** 
 (14.991) (3.422) (3.881) (1.370) (2.908) 
No. of Obs. 34 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.154 0.165 0.111 0.002 0.020 
 
 
Panel C. Loan choices and default experience for the treatment group 
Dependent Decision Time HR Interest Rate IRR Term Amount 
variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Default 44.35*** -0.44** -1.80** 0.16 5.24 -1,546.67 
 (3.64) (-2.58) (-2.37) (0.32) (-1.47) (-0.72) 
Constant 87.320*** 0.440*** 16.800*** 14.837*** 11.760*** 9,880.000*** 
 (13.95) (5.01) (43.02) (56.27) (6.40) (8.93) 
No. of Obs. 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.293 0.172 0.149 0.003 0.063 0.016 
 
